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Abstract:  In this paper we review, and draw some lessons from, the UMTS-auctions 
that have taken place in Europe during 2000 and 2001. We address several design 
issues and, in particular, focus attention on asymmetries between the bidders and on 
possibilities for collusion. An outlook is provided to several other auctions in which 
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1.  INTRODUCTION   
 
  The UMTS (third generation mobile telecommunication) auctions that have taken 
place in Europe during 2000 have drawn a lot of attention from academics, 
practitioners and from the public at large. Newspapers have focused on the very high 
prices that were paid in some countries and in the sharp drop in market values of 
telecommunication companies after these auctions. From the time when the UK-
auction started (March 2000) to August 2001, when Denmark was about the last 
Western European country to auction, the Dow Jones European telecom index lost 
two-thirds of its value, a drop considerably deeper than that of about 1/4
th in the 
overall index. In one extreme case, the share price of Dutch KPN dropped from a high 
of around  €73 to a low of €2.03. Of course, this market drop may simply be the 
bursting of a bubble; the market realizing that previous expectations about the bright 
future of UMTS were exaggerated. Nevertheless, in the eyes of the public, the 
auctions were a m ajor factor in explaining the loss in market value for 
telecommunications firms, see The Economist (2000, 2001).  
 
  Academics, while intrigued by the high absolute amounts paid in some countries, 
focused more on the large variation in prices across countries. Table 1 lists the auction 
revenue (in  € per capita) in the various countries that used the auction mechanism. 
While some variability might be expected as a result of country differences (for 
example, in per capita income or in the cost of rolling out a network), the variability is 
too large to be explained by this factor alone. In Table 1, the countries are ordered 
according to the time at which they auctioned the licenses, and it is obvious that the 
order mattered: the earlier, the higher the revenue. Some of  this may be explained by 
changing perceptions of the market through time. Alternatively, countries moving first 
may have had a genuine advantage; they did not only sell licenses to operate in their 
country, but also an option to create a pan-European network. A third factor is that, 
over time, firms learned to play the game better. At the start of the auction season, 
consolidation of the industry had not yet taken place, and firms had not yet realised 
that it was better to co-operate (agree before the auction) than to compete head-on in 
the auction. Obviously, also existing (2G-) market structure mattered: in the 
Netherlands, 5 licenses were auctioned in a market in which already 5 2G-operators 
were active, which partly accounts for the low revenue there. Academics noted that   3 
the various countries used different auction methods and knowing that details may 
matter, they addressed the question how much these design differences contributed to 
explaining the differences in revenue.  
 
Country  2G  3G  Revenue  Country  2G  3G  Revenue 
UK  4  5  650  Austria  4  6  105 
Netherlands  5  5  170  Switzerland  3  4  20 
Germany  4  6  620  Belgium  3  4  45 
Italy  4  5  210  Denmark  4  4  95 
 
Table 1 : Auction revenues (2G denotes the number of incumbent operators, 3G the 
number of 3G-licenses auctioned, revenue is in € per capita) 
 
  In this paper, we draw some lessons that can be learned from the European 
UMTS-auctions. The aim of the paper is not to contribute to auction theory as such. 
The paper rather focuses on the applications side. When it comes to designing an 
auction, a great number of issues have to be addressed, such as: 
i)  what is the goal to be achieved? 
ii)  what is to be sold, and how should supply be packaged? 
iii)  how to attract bidders and how to create a “level playing field” amongst them? 
iv)  which auction mechanism can best be used? 
v)  how to enforce the rules of the game? 
These questions deal with objectives, supply, demand, the market institution 
(including the payment mechanism), and legal (competition) issues respectively. 
Auction theory focuses mainly on the fourth question, taking the other aspects as 
given, and it has generated many valuable insights. While it is true that, as Klemperer 
(2000) has put it, in auction design “the devil is in the details”, this should not make 
us blind for the fact t hat the other four aspects are extremely relevant as well. 
Furthermore, we should bear in mind that frequently an auction is not an isolated 
event, but that it takes place in the context of a larger game. In this paper, we focus on 
these other aspects, the aim being to provide a framework for thinking that makes 
auction theory even more useful for applications. Through various examples of other   4 




2.  THE EUROPEAN UMTS-AUCTIONS   
 
  With the above checklist in mind, we briefly discuss here some salient aspects of 
the European UMTS-auctions. Motivated by these observations, the next sections then 
discuss some of these issues in somewhat greater detail. 
 
  Most governments adopted as their goals to ensure efficient use of spectrum, to 
create a competitive 3G-market, and, subsidiary, to generate revenue. In the next 
section we discuss why auctions may, or may not allow efficiency and revenue 
objectives being reached.  
 
  As far as supply is concerned, 60 MHz of paired spectrum was auctioned in all 
countries
2. Technical requirements imply that this spectrum be split in blocks of 5 
MHz, while for a viable network at least 10 MHz is needed. It follows that market 
structures with 3 players (3 x 20), 4 players (4 x 15), 5 players (2 x 15 and 3 x 10), 
and with 6 players (6 x 10) are possible. A first question is whether the government or 
the market should determine the market structure, i.e. should the number of license 
winners be fixed exogenously or should it be determined endogenously? Austria and 
Germany opted for the second alternative, all other countries fixed the market 
structure beforehand. Belgium, Switzerland and Denmark followed the proposal of 
the UMTS-forum (an expert group from the industry) and allocated 4 licenses of 15 
MHz each. In the UK and the Netherlands, 2 large licenses and 3 small ones were 
auctioned.  In each of these countries, bidders knew the full technical details of all 
licenses at the start of the auction. Italy, Germany, and Austria auctioned abstract lots 
that appeared identical to the bidders: bidders knew what quantity of spectrum they 
would get, but not which frequencies. Italy auctioned 5 licenses, each one consisting 
of 10 MHz, with new entrants having the option to buy an additional block of 5 MHz 
at a reduced price. In Germany and Austria, 12 abstract lots of 5 MHz were offered, 
                                                                 
2 We do not discuss the unpaired spectrum that was auctioned at the same time, but for which no 
profitable use was known at the time of the auction.   5 
with bidders allowed to be active on at most 3 lots in each round and with a bidder 
who was active only on 1 lot forced to quit  the auction. Hence, in these countries 
outcomes with 4, 5 of 6 winners were possible. 
 
  All countries had a light qualification procedure before the auction in which 
interested parties had to prove that they were capable of offering the 3G-service. In 
both Germany and Italy one bidder did not pass this test. Countries differed in the 
extent to which new entrants got some preferential treatment. In the UK, one (large) 
license was set aside for a newcomer, and new entrants also had the right of roaming, 
according to regulated rates, on existing 2G-networks. No such preferential treatment 
was given in Germany and in the Netherlands. In Italy, in addition to having roaming 
rights, a newcomer could buy additional spectrum at a reduced rate. 
 
  Most countries used  a variant of the simultaneous multiround ascending auction, 
which had been pioneered in the US; see Milgrom (2000) for description and analysis. 
In the UK, bidders were fully informed about all bids that were made; hence, this 
auction was very transparent. The Dutch government was worried that transparency 
might make collusion easier, hence, it made less information available: bidders only 
knew the currently highest bids and currently highest bidders. Similar, limited, 
information was available in the German and Austrian auctions. In these latter 
countries twelve abstract lots were auctioned that appeared identical to the bidders. 
Each bidder started with three bidding rights, but a bidding right was permanently lost 
if a bidder was active (i.e. bidding, or standing high) on only two lots. As one did not 
always know how many bidding rights a competitor still had, these auctions were not 
fully transparent. Note that, while the German and Austrian governments were selling 
12 units of a homogeneous commodity, they were using a design that had been 
developed to auction heterogeneous lots. With abstract lots, a much simpler design 
could have been used, with bidders simply expressing their demand at the current 
(single) price, and the price being raised until demand equals supply. In essence, the 
Italian design had this property. In that auction, bidders were ranked according to 
their bids and each bidder who was not among the five current highest bidders had to 
raise his bid above the fifth highest or to quit the auction. The Italian auction was 
discriminatory, with winners having to pay their final bid, which induced a game of 
trying to avoid being the winner with the highest final bid.   6 
 
  The only country that did not use a multi-round format was Denmark, and 
deliberately so. The Danish regulator wanted to stimulate entry and argued that an 
ascending auction would be less likely to attract new entrants than a sealed bid 
discriminatory auction. At the same time, it apparently was considered undesirable 
that winners pay different amounts for identical licenses. As a compromise, a fourth-
price sealed bid auction was adopted, hence, all winners paid the lowest accepted 
price. With a minimum price of DKr 500 million and four bids, the resulting auction 
price was DKr 950 million, with one newcomer winning a license (and one incumbent 
2G-player not bidding), hence, the objectives appear to be achieved. 
 
  In several countries, there were accusations of anti-competitive behaviour. 
Below, we discuss the case of the Netherlands.  In Germany, the CEO of France 
Telecom offered Debitel, a weak entrant, access to its network in case Debitel would 
not win a license. In Austria, the CEO of Telekom Austria (the largest player on the 
market) informed the market before the auction that he w ould be satisfied with just 
two of the blocks, and that, if the others behaved similarly, it should be possible to get 
the frequencies on sensible terms. He also made it clear that his firm was willing to 
bid on 3 blocks if other bidders would pursue such  an aggressive strategy. (See Total 
Telecom “ ? ustrian UMTS auction unlikely to scale peaks”, October 31, 2000.) The 
competition authorities challenged none of the above actions. In Italy, the competition 
authority investigated the exit of Blu, a weak incumbent, that happened unexpectedly 
early, but no violations of the auction rules, or of the competition laws were found. 
 
  By now several detailed descriptions of the behaviour in these auctions are 
available, sometimes including game theoretic analysis. Plott and Salmon (2001) and 
Börgers and Dustman (2001) study the UK-auction, among others addressing the 
question whether behaviour is consistent with the independent private values model. 
Van Damme (2001) studies the Dutch auction. Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) is an 
insightful paper that, among others, argues that the German design may risk resulting 
in a too concentrated market structure. Grimm, Riedel and Wolfstetter (2001) offer an 
explanation for why the German auction did not stop in round 125, when the 7th 
bidder, Debitel had dropped out, but instead continued till round 173, when the 6   7 
winners collectively were  € 20 billion poorer. In Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) that 
outcome had been called “bizarre”, but Grimm et al. derive it as a sequential 
equilibrium outcome, given uncertainty about the willingness to pay of 
Telefonica/Sonera 3G-consortium. Wolfstetter (2001) compares the Austrian auction 
to the Swiss and concludes that a design in which the number of licenses is 
endogenous is to be preferred. Klemperer (2001) discusses various of these aspects in 
more detail than I do here. 
 
  In all of these papers, each single auction is analysed in isolation. While many 
insights can be derived from such an analysis, it should not be forgotten that these 
auctions were “subgames” of one large game, in which the objectives of players may 
have been to create a pan-European 3G-network. This perspective may offer new 
insights. For example, in the UK, players may have been willing to bid more than the 
stand-alone value of a UK-license: winning meant winning an option on a European 
network. Similarly, the German auction may be viewed as a battle between KPN 
(owner of E -plus) and Telefonica. These two parties had been involved in (failed) 
merger negotiations before the auction. If Telefonica had not won a German license, 
the networks of KPN and Telefonica would have been largely complementary, while, 
with networks overlapping in Germany, Telefonica emerges much stronger in 
possible follow-up negotiations. Aspects of this type have received little attention up 
to now, with Maasland and Onderstal (2001) perhaps being an exception. That paper 
argues that, if bidders meet each other in multiple markets, losers may have an 
incentive to drive up the price the winner pays now, in order to make him a less fierce 
competitor later, and it investigates the consequences of such financial externalities in 
a standard auction context. 
 
 
3.  AUCTIONS, GOALS AND EFFICIENCY 
   8 
  Some European countries (in particular Spain and the Nordic countries) used a 
beauty contest instead of an auction to award the licenses.
3 For these countries, 
generating revenue apparently was not a goal. For most governments the primary 
objective was to guarantee that spectrum be efficiently utilised and to establish a 
competitive telecommunications market; auction revenue was specified only as a 
secondary goal, if it was a goal at all. This already raises the question whether 
revenue should indeed only be a secondary goal; after all an auction might be the least 
distorting way to tax. In any case, with two mechanisms being used, one wonders 
about their comparative properties: which one is best suited to reach the stated goals?  
 
  The European Commission had expressed reservations about using auctions, as it 
was thought that auctions could lead to higher consumer prices and delayed 
innovation, see European Commission (1994). Of course, (sunk) auction cost will not 
be passed through if the standard assumptions of profit maximisation are made but, in 
reality, pricing may result from different principles. In this respect, the experimental 
results reported in Offerman and Potters (1999) are interesting. In their setting, 
subjects can acquire licenses to play a Bertrand game with differentiated products, 
with the licences being distributed randomly, or allocated through auction to those 
subjects that are willing to pay most for them. The authors observe that auction 
winners charge higher prices than lottery winners do. Furthermore, the higher the 
auction price, the higher the price charged in the market. While one may be sceptical 
about sunk cost influencing prices in real life markets, economists have conceded that, 
if auction prices would go very high, this could lead to an increase in the cost of 
capital, which in turn could delay innovation, see McMillan (1998). The cost of 
capital of telecommunication firms has indeed gone up after the auctions. The 
resulting increase in WACC’s may possibly feed through to higher prices in the 
regulated sector, either because firms that are subject to some form of return 
regulation, or because or because of a reduction in the efficiency parameter X in an 
RPI-X scheme is based on it.  
 
                                                                 
3 France used a hybrid mechanism; it intended to allocate, by means of a beauty contest, four licenses 
to parties that were willing to pay a license fee of approximately € 85 per capita. As only 2 firms were 
willing to pay this price, the French government has had to change its plans; in particular it had to 
lower the price.   9 
  The countries that used the auction mechanism did this because of the claimed 
efficiency properties of auctions. Frequently, however, the official documents remain 
somewhat vague about what is actually meant with efficiency. Furthermore, the 
claims in these documents, that auctions produce efficient outcomes, have to be 
qualified. There are at least two reasons why auctions need not lead to an efficient 
outcome: 
i)  asymmetries between the bidders; 
ii)  value maximization does not guarantee efficiency. 
 
  Vickrey (1961) already showed that, if players are in asymmetric positions, the 
standard first price sealed bid auction need not generate an efficient outcome. The 
intuition is simple: the player that is in the weaker position needs to bid  more 
aggressively, while the other bidder can relax a bit; as a result, the weaker bidder may 
win even though the stronger bidder has the higher value. While, given independent 
private values, the ascending auction guarantees efficiency, Vickrey showed that the 
first price auction may result in higher revenue. The second reason for inefficiency is 
of particular importance for license auctions, as Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) have 
stressed. In these auctions, only firms are active, and the interests of consumers are 
not directly taken into account. Consequently, the firms that attach the highest values 




  Gilbert and Newberry (1981) already linked these two reasons for inefficiency. In 
a situation where a license to compete on a currently monopolistic market is 
auctioned, they show that the present monopolist will win as he values this license 
more than any competitor. The argument is simply that, if he wins the license, the 
monopoly profit  ? m remains intact, whereas an entrant can expect only duopoly 
profits  ? d. Since  ? m  -? d > ? d, the monopolist values the license more, while 
                                                                 
4 The consumers’ desire for product differentiation may drive a wedge between efficiency and value 
maximization. A concrete example is radio broadcasting. Popular formats raise more advertising 
revenue than say classical music, so that, if no formats are pre-specified, an ordinary auction may result 
in all license winners adopting a “middle of the road” format, hence, little diversity, see Steiner (1952). 
In the Netherlands, confusion about the goals to be reached, and a limited understanding of what 
auctions could achieve, led to auctions being criticized as a mechanism for allocating licenses for 
commercial radio stations; the end result may be that a beauty contest will be used to allocate this 
valuable spectrum.   10 
maximisation of welfare demands that an entrant wins the additional license. Clearly, 
if we want the desirable outcome to result, we should not use an ordinary auction, 
rather we should ban the monopolist from the auction, or handicap him in some other 
way. 
 
  In the UMTS-auctions, both of these aspects are relevant. These are license 
auctions and, in addition, there are important asymmetries and value differences 
between bidders, for example, between incumbents and entrants. One such difference 
arises from the fact that, upon not winning a license, an incumbent might loose not 
only his new 3G-costumers, but also his existing 2G-business. Another element of 
asymmetry is the cost of rolling out a network, which may be much lower for an 
incumbent than for an entrant. For example, Fortis (2000) estimates the capital cost 
(associated with base s tations) to be some 30% higher for new entrants than for 
incumbents. A back of the envelope calculation may show how large the resulting 
value differences may be. Assume that, for a certain small country, the ARPU 
(average revenue per user) is € 40 per month and that firms discount future profit with 
1 percent per month. If it takes two years to roll out a network and if from that time 
the market size is constant, at say 6 million users, then total gross value is € 18 bln. If 
an incumbent has capital cost of € 1 bln and an expected market share of 1/3, one gets 
a net value of  € 5 bln. A new entrant can expect only a lower market share. If it 
calculates with a market share of 10% and, consistent with the Fortis-estimates incurs 
capex of  € 1.3 bln., then its v alue is only  € 0.5 bln. The resulting difference is not 
marginal, it is an order of magnitude. 
 
  Of course, the above calculations are only indicative. In practise there will be 
uncertainty about the new services to consumers, hence about the ARPU’s, and t his 
will introduce a common value component, which may actually be rather large. 
Secondly, firms may differ in their discount rates (WACC’s) and this introduces 
another asymmetry. However, the fact remains that the differences in objective 
network cost and market shares are rather large, so that the playing field is not level 
and incumbents have better chances of winning than new entrants. 
   11 
 
4.  THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ASYMMETRIES 
 
  In real life situations, asymmetries may be the rule rather than the exception. I 
briefly describe two other auction settings, both actual examples from the Netherlands 
where they played a role. The first is the gasoline market. In a special report, a 
government committee concluded that the Dutch market was characterised by a lack 
of competition. A set of remedies was proposed, including the auctioning of new 
licenses. A study, however, revealed the existing of network effects, possibly caused 
by loyalty schemes. Specifically, it was shown that revenue of a station did not only 
depend on the location of the station, but also on the market share of the operator, 
with a larger market share being accompanied with a larger revenue per location. This 
study suggested that the value of an additional license may be increasing in the 
number o f licenses that one already has and that there is a snowballing effect. If that 
would be true, an ordinary auction, in which all bidders are treated symmetrically may 
not do very well in creating a more competitive market (see Onderstal (2001), Krishna 
(1999)). 
 
  A second example is provided by the electricity market. The European 
Commission tries to create a unified European electricity market, but, at the moment, 
the market is still rather fragmented and large price differences exist. For example, 
prices  in Germany are much lower than in the Netherlands. The price difference can 
persist because there is scarcity of transport capacity across the border. In 2000, it was 
decided to auction this capacity and a bureau was set up to implement the auctions, 
see  www.tso-auction.org for details. Here one might imagine that transport capacity is 
more valuable for the Dutch incumbents than for the German entrants to the Dutch 
market. Consequently, if one wants to realize the b enefits of competition, one should 
not organize an ordinary auction. One possibility would be to ban Dutch producers 
from this auction. Such a drastic decision was not taken: incumbents can acquire part 
of the capacity and that part is subject to a “use or lose” clause. A simple model may, 
however, suggest that such a clause is not sufficient to get the benefits of competition, 
that full exclusion would be better. 
   12 
  Recognizing asymmetries is one thing, what to do to incorporate the fact that the 
playing field is unlevel is quite another. Klemperer (2000) and others have argued 
that, in case of asymmetries, it may be desirable to have a first price sealed bid 
auction rather than an ascending, open second price auction. The intuition underlying 
this argument  is already contained in Vickrey (1961): a second price auction produces 
an efficient outcome, so that an entrant, who expects to have a lower value, may 
decide not to participate. In a first price auction, the weaker bidder has a positive 
probability of winning, hence, a higher expected utility and this may therefore induce 
him to participate. In other words, a first price auction may attract more bidders, 
which in turn may lead to a higher price and a more competitive market structure. 
Abbink et al.  (2001) describe experiments that aim at testing this intuition. Their 
paper is motivated by the problem faced by the UK-authorities, when they thought 
they could only sell four 3G-licenses in a four player market. The paper compares the 
Anglo-Dutch design proposed in Klemperer (1998) with the ascending format. It 
concludes that, given their assumptions on the value distributions, these formats are 
comparable in their efficiency properties, but that the ascending auction induces more 
entry. Further work is clearly needed to judge the robustness of this conclusion. 
 
  Myerson (1981) suggests an alternative, more direct route: if the playing field is 
not level because of asymmetries between the bidders, then one may choose to 
discriminate against the stronger bidders  by handicapping them in the auction. One 
could use an auction mechanism in which players are treated asymmetrically: the 
rules would differentiate among incumbents and entrants. In the domain of regulation, 
such asymmetric treatment is not unusual. For example, in the telecommunications 
sector, firms with “significant market power” have stricter obligations imposed upon 
them than operators without SMP. Also in auctions asymmetric treatment has been 
used: in the UK one license was reserved for new entrants,  with incumbents not 
allowed to bid on it. Myerson (1981) suggests, however, that full exclusion is not 
optimal, that it may be desirable to give bidding credits to weaker bidders. For 
example, in the UMTS-context described above, if it really costs a newcomer € 300 
million more to construct a network, then the government could decide to give the 
newcomer a compensation equal to this amount in case he would win. In effect this 
would allow newcomer to bid more aggressively, and this would drive up the price. 
   13 
  Asymmetric treatment of this more sophisticated type was part of the auction 
rules in some of the US-spectrum auctions: designated firms only had to pay a certain 
fraction of their bid when being successful winners. Would such forms of preferential 
treatment be possible in Europe as well? This primarily is a legal question and the 
answer may depend on how certain European regulations are interpreted. When 
economists proposed to use an asymmetric auction in the gasoline example mentioned 
above, lawyers mentioned two possible problems: asymmetric auctions may involve 
discrimination and they may involve state aid. The argument relating to state aid is the 
following. Assume, for example, that an incumbent bids 90, and an entrant (with a 
bidding credit of 25%)  bids 100, so that the entrant wins and pays 75. According to 
certain lawyers, it could now be argued that the government gives an explicit subsidy 
of 15 to the entrant, which could be classified as state aid. Of course, this argument is 
not convincing at all, since the only reason that the incumbent bids 90 may be that he 
is handicapped. As has been empirically verified in Ayres and Cramton (1996), such 
asymmetric treatment may lead to higher revenues rather than to lower, hence, the 
state aid argument need not apply. Nevertheless it appears that some lawyers are not 
that easily convinced by this argument. In any case it seems clear that a discussion on 
whether those aspects that are desirable from an economics point of view are also 
feasible from the legal  point of view could be very fruitful. This discussion would 
then also reveal how far one can go in introducing asymmetries: why would full 
exclusion be allowed, but other forms not? 
 
 
5.  WHY PLAY ON AN UNLEVEL PLAYING FIELD? 
 
  The Dutch UMTS-auction design has been criticized for the fact that 5 licenses 
were auctioned in a situation with 5 incumbents, see Klemperer (2001), Jehiel and 
Moldovanu (2001). These authors argue that, in such a situation, an entrant cannot 
expect to win a license and both attribute t he fact that the Dutch auction only drew 
few entrants and generated low revenue to this aspect in the design. Even though this 
criticism is justified in part
5, the point is that, if correct, it implies that there should 
                                                                 
5 The Dutch government did not have revenue as an official goal, hence, the criticism is valid only if an 
entrant would have contributed to a more competitive market. To judge whether this could be true, one   14 
not have been any entry at all. However, there was one newcomer in this auction: 
Versatel. Versatel participated even though it knew that it could not win a license. In 
fact, Versatel made every possible effort to communicate to the incumbents that it 
knew that it could not win. It started l egal action, both at the Dutch and at the EU 
level against the Dutch 5 -to-5 arrangement, in order (in my interpretation) to create a 
common knowledge that it could not win. 
 
  If Versatel did not participate to win, then it must have participated with some 
other goal in mind. A press release of Versatel shortly before the auction reveals 
Versatel’s motives: 
 
“We would however not like to see that we end up with nothing whilst other 
players get their licenses for free. Versatel invites the incumbent mobile 
operators to immediately start negotiations for access to their existing 2G 
networks as well as entry to the 3G market either as a part owner of a 
license or as a mobile virtual network operator” 
 
  The message is clear: Versatel did not play to win, but rather to get concessions 
from the other players. Reading the above, one is reminded of a simple example from 
Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996). The similarity is remarkable, but perhaps not too 
surprising given that Nalebuff was one of Versatel’s advisors. In that example, a 
seller, who attaches value 0 to the single indivisible object that he owns, faces two 
prospective buyers with values v and V with 0 < v < V. If this seller attracts the weak 
buyer, he will sell at a higher price (p=v) as when he does not succeed in doing so 
(p=0). Consequently, the seller is willing to pay the weak buyer to enter, while the 
strong buyer is willing to pay his competitor to stay out. Clearly, the weak buyer has 
some bargaining power, and, by playing cleverly, he should be able to derive a profit. 
 
  The actual auction context was slightly more complicated than this simple 
example. Presumably, the government could not be induced to pay, and the fact that 
there were multiple incumbents, introduced a free rider problem: all of them profit 
from Versatel staying out, but only one of them has to pay the price of allowing the 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
should bear in mind that three of the incumbents have only entered the Dutch market relatively 
recently: they had bought their 2G-licenses in an auction in 1998, see Van Damme (1999).   15 
entrant on its network. Another difficulty is that starting negotiations with Versatel 
might be viewed as collusion, hence, might be punished, possibly by exclusion from 
the auction. This raises the question of who will take up the gauntlet and whether 
doing so is an act of collusion. 
 
  As a matter of fact, BT-subsidiary Telfort took up the gauntlet, and the Dutch 
competition authority, NMa, has meanwhile concluded that conducting negotiations 
about access while the auction is taking place does not constitute collusion. While an 
economist might find that surprising, one can also understand the decision of the 
NMa. Consider the hypothetical scenario in which an incumbent offers a contract of 
the type “we offer access under those and these conditions, provided that we acquire a 
license for less than  € X”. There is no explicit collusion, nor parallel conduct. 
However, the entrant might very well decide not to participate in the auction, but 
instead take up the offer. 
 
  We don’t know whether Telfort made such an offer to Versatel, however, we do 
know that the negotiations were not successful. Some two weeks after the start of the 
auction, when Versatel was the highest bidder on a small lot with a bid of 
approximately € 25 per capita, Telfort sent a letter to Versatel stating: 
 
“Expert opinion indicates to Telfort that you will soon reach a bid level that 
is not in the interest of your company and its shareholders (...) The ulterior 
motive for such a bid must be that Versatel is attempting to raise its 
competitors’ cost or to gain access to their 2G or 3G networks. (...) A bid 
strategy with such a motive constitutes a tort towards Telfort, who will hold 
Versatel liable for all damages as a result of this (...) To conclude, Telfort 
intends to treat the matter as strictly confidential in the interest of the proper 
course of the auction.”  
 
  Versatel interpreted this statement as a credible threat preventing it from bidding 
any  further. It communicated this to the auctioneer, and to Telfort, and requested that 
Telfort, hence, be eliminated from the auction. The auctioneer saw nothing wrong 
with the letter and allowed the auction to continue. On the last day, bidding continued 
for seven more rounds, with only Telfort and Versatel knowing that Versatel would   16 
make no more bids. When Telfort finally overbid Versatel, thereby indeed terminating 
the auction, total revenue was 17 % higher than it had been at the point in time Telfort 
sent the letter. After the auction, the competition authority saw nothing wrong with 
Telfort’s letter. 
 
  There are a couple of general points here. First, the auction is not an isolated 
event, it takes place in a certain context. Secondly, the anti-trust laws appear too weak 
to combat behavior that many economists would classify as being clearly anti-
competitive. Consequently, if one wants to prevent such behavior, one should do it 
through the auction rules. For example, the Italian rules prohibited communications 
relating to strategy and contacts between the players. The press release of Versatel 
and the contacts between Versatel and Telfort would have been violations of the rules, 
subject to exclusion, in the Italian context. In other European auctions, even  though 
not as extreme as in the Netherlands, also communication between players took place. 
Hence, also there was some evidence of anti-competitive behavior. As in the 
Netherlands, this behavior was not penalized. Finally, the above case shows that the 
government may find it difficult to commit itself to exclude players from the auction 
as it thereby hurts its own revenue. Clearly, the roles of the auctioneer and of the 
seller should be clearly separated. 
 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
 
  The UMTS-auctions have offered a very instructive experience. The stakes in 
these auctions were high, so that they proved a rough test bed for auction theory. On 
the other hand, the auction setting was reasonably simple, as there were only few 
possibilities to structure supply and since each  bidder was allowed to acquire at most 
one license. Nevertheless, even in this relatively simple setting a great many different 
design issues to be addressed, and many different designs were possible and tried. It 
has had become clear that details of the actual design matter, hence, that such details 
deserve attention. One may hope, and can expect, that in the future these details will 
receive more attention than they have gotten in the past.
6  
                                                                 
6 It is easy to point to examples where improvement is possible. In the auction mentioned in Section 4, 
capacities at two interconnectors between Germany and the Netherlands is sold; capacities at these   17 
 
  While the theory gives a lot of insight in the actual auctions, it should also be 
clear from the material above that our understanding is far from perfect. A case in 
point is offered by the auctions in Denmark and Hong Kong, that both took place in 
September 2001. Both were designed by the same experts, involving ELSECO, and 
on the basis of the most recent insights. Both were essentially single shot sealed bid 
auctions, with one difference being that in Hong Kong the price was equal to the 
highest rejected bid, while in Denmark the price was equal to the lowest accepted bid. 
While both auctions resulted in a similar revenue per capita (around €100), the Hong 
Kong auction was typically regarded as a flop (of the 6 incumbent 2G operators, only 
4 bid for a 3G-license and there were no new entrants, so that the price was t he 
minimum price), while the Danish auction was considered a success. Is the difference 
due to the one essential difference in the design? 
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